Introduction
This paper discusses challenges for competition authorities in the 21 st century. Those guidance. Those instruments are, however, no surrogate for "positive enforcement". They do not seek to clarify the substance of antitrust law. They simply try to raise awareness to the existence of competition rules. And when they do touch upon substantive issues, they stay at helicopter level. Finally, they do not originate from real life cases, they are very abstract. So whilst certainly useful, especially for new antitrust jurisdictions where market participants must be educated, advocacy instruments do not replace positive enforcement.
And this problem is further compounded by a recent decisional evolution. Whilst reasoned prohibition decisions do exhibit a certain degree of guidance, those decisions are, as will be discussed below, growingly replaced by settlements decisions, which come in summary form.
As a result of this, even negative enforcement is less and less a source of guidance. At both 6 In contrast, bodies of "negative" case-law send erroneous signals. Firms may exhibit a disproportionate degree of risk aversion and, in turn, abstain from welfare-enhancing conduct (type I errors). 7 To be a little more accurate, it consists essentially in the hours spent putting pen to paper, drafting a decision concealing the findings of this investigation. 8 In sum, our opinion is that optimal competition compliance necessarily requires an enforcement mix that combines deterrence and guidance activities, in the following spirit :
Optimal Compliance (OC) = deterrence through negative enforcement (D) + guidance through positive enforcement (G), with D > G; and D < 1 and G > 0. The exact calibration of D and G remains, however, a complex issue, which has been under-researched in modern competition scholarship and which arguably would warrant more attention from competition authorities.
Avoiding the "Settle 'Em All" Approach
Competition agencies exhibit a growing appetite for "settlement" decisions (labeled "commitments" in the EU and "consent decrees" in the US). Under a settlement, the authority closes proceedings in exchange of binding commitments from the parties to end the suspected infringement. Both behavioral and structural commitments can be given.
Settlements are win-win instruments. The parties avoid the stain of sin. There's no decision finding an infringement. The agency obtains a remedy. Yet it does not have to prove the infringement. And both can turn to other business quickly.
Numbed by the attractiveness of settlements, authorities increasingly abandon traditional enforcement. This is particularly true in abuse of dominance cases. In the EU, since 19
October 2008 -5 years ago -there has been 13 commitments decisions in abuse cases, and only 2 infringement decisions. 9 But settlements are also pervasive in horizontal and vertical coordination cases. settlements. This method is advantageous because there is no need to prove an infringement.
But the agency can nonetheless secure remedies as extensive as in standard enforcement. The Commissioner's proposed new approach bears resemblance to utility regulation: intervention takes place ex ante, (ideally) before the occurrence of actual anticompetitive effects; due process safeguards are kept to a minimum; intrusive remedies are imposed; there are no fines; etc. In other words, the Commission seems willing to take the clothes of a quasiregulator on those markets.
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On cursory analysis, one could see some good sense to the Commissioner's proposed approach. After all, fast markets seem to require fast antitrust agencies. But two key features of utility regulation are missing on high-tech markets, thereby casting doubt on the adequacy of the Commissioner's proposal.
First, unlike mature utility industries, high-tech markets, and conduct on such markets, are difficult to read prospectively. 21 In such markets, firms often display the apparent traits of the bad monopolist: very high market shares, aggressive market behaviour, comfortable profit margins. Now, these elements should not be mistaken for proof of significant market power or of abuse. Large markets shares are often ephemeral; high profit margins may reward substantial risk-taking, and be due to the specificities of the cost structures in high tech
markets. And what appears to be aggressive conduct may just be a wholly novel commercial strategy which does not fall neatly within existing standards of per se legality.
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All this exacerbates the vexing "identification problem" that exists in abuse of dominance cases. It is indeed harder in high tech markets to separate the wheat of competition on the merits from the chaff of anticompetitive behavior. In other words, technology markets may be more prone to decisional errors in the anticipative, ex ante, approach of the Commissioner. Where things get tricky is that the consequences of getting it wrong may be far more severe than in other industries. This is so for at least two reasons. First, Professor Varian 23 has shown that these markets are often "combinatorial". 24 Hence, wrong antitrust intervention in one component -digital cameras -may have unintended consequences in one or more interdependent components -smartphones.
Second, errors in high technology markets harm the incentives to innovate of the alleged infringer but also of all innovators more generally. 25 This is because these markets by their nature usually lack legal precedents. Any decision against innovative types of conduct will become the yardstick against which other innovators will assess their strategies. All this casts doubt on the transposition of the Commissioner's quasi regulatory approach in fast moving markets. Undeniably, in the years ahead, dealing with those markets will be a grain of sand in the shoes of agencies.
Ensuring Optimal Detection and Compensation in Cartel Cases
The rise of actions for damages by victims of cartels has unintended consequences on competition agencies. In jurisdictions without discovery rules, courts turn to competition 23 The debate on this is thriving. And rather than adding another brick in the wall, it is submitted here that in addition to the threat of extinguishing leniency applications, the choice of a generous disclosure policy may also undermine international cooperation between agencies. It is well known that agencies across the globe exchange a lot of information, and that this is crucial to a fruitful resolution of many cases. In this context, some agencies may, in the future, refuse to transfer leniency-related documents to others, when the requesting agency has a disclosure-friendly policy or if the national law makes disclosure mandatory.
Finding the right Stance on Compliance Programmes
This last enforcement challenge is controversial. Firms, including a good deal of former infringers, are on the campaign trail. In essence, they advocate that agencies should reduce fines imposed on companies who have adopted a so-called "compliance programme" 35 In our opinion, the case for rewarding compliance programmes with fines reduction is weak. 40 First, because it is odd to provide financial incentives to promote compliance with the law. Or to be more accurate, it would be weird to reward the initiative of trying to comply with the law (in reality, the caught firm did not comply). As soon as a legal statute is in force, which lays down obligations on private and natural persons, compliance is the rule. And firms should not complain that enforcement is too harsh. As the old saying goes, "dura lex, sed lex".
If we push this logic further, agencies should indeed reward infringing companies if they can prove that they have hired lawyers to obtain regular competition advice. The Bar would certainly like that… Second, compliance programmes are useful for companies at any rate, and there's no need for an additional fining stimulus to encourage them. Compliance programmes promote awareness to what constitutes an infringement within firms, and to how much it costs to commit one. Therefore, they decrease the probability of infringement in the first place. Moreover, with better trained in-house lawyers and executives, the costs of legal services outsourced to external lawyers may decrease. Fifth, whilst there may be some sense to the argument that compliance programmes should attract discounts in areas where the law is murky, this argument has much less traction in areas where the law is crystal clear, such as in cartel cases.
In view of all this, why reward compliance programmes?
II.
New Substantive Challenges
Uncovering the True Goal(S) of Competition Statutes
In general, competition rules do not expressly state their underlying purpose, or purposes.
With an enduring economic crisis at the kitchen table, and pronouncements in all directions from judicial organs, studies over the goals competition law have sprouted. 41 Scholars have invested countless efforts playing mentalist, pondering over the mindset of the antitrust lawmakers, the historical context surrounding the adoption of competition rules, etc.
The divide between antitrust scholars is great. Some, in the US tradition, believe that competition law seeks to achieve welfare-enhancing outcomes, yet they disagree on their exact content (consumer welfare, total welfare, efficiency, etc.). 42 Other, influenced by German ordo-liberal theory, consider that competition protects the process of rivalry, understood as market structures with plenty of firms, even if this comes at the expense of efficiency. 43 Another group of scholars argues that "consumer choice" is the DNA of competition law. 44 And finally, others ascribe additional public policy goals to competition law. In their view, competition law can and should be used as a "swiss knife", to pursue public policy objectives of all sorts, such as industrial policy, trade policy, employment policy, environmental policy, cultural policy, etc. 45 Within this jungle of opinions, the International Competition Network (ICN) has initiated consultations on whether "consumer welfare" can be an acceptable common denominator for agencies across the world. 46 Whilst agencies mull their options, it is submitted here that three key principles should be kept in mind. First, both the US Sherman act and the EU Treaty rules on competition, which constitute the templates for many competition regimes across the globe, were adopted to ensure low prices or, in the word of economists, allocative efficiency. 47 Other considerations, such as the protection of democracy in the US or market integration in the EU, come only as second order priorities. Moreover, one may observe that it makes no sense to distinguish market integration from allocative and productive efficiency since market integration aims at allowing buyers to benefit from the most competitive opportunities on the internal market, or put differently, to provide them with an efficient allocation of resources.
Second, leaving this issue unanswered should be no option. Agencies and/or courts, should urgently seek to assign a single explicit purpose to competition law. Like tax or criminal law, competition enforcement leads to drastic limitations on fundamental freedoms: investigations, fines, behavioural and structural remedies. This, in and of itself, pleads for delineating accurate and narrow grounds for public intervention on the basis of the competition rules.
Finally, agencies and/or courts should refrain from endorsing the "swiss knife" approach of competition enforcement. Otherwise, competition rules, and in particular remedies, may be tweaked to achieve outcomes which normally fall within the remit of majoritarian policies.
standards that inferred anticompetitive effects on the basis of an analysis of the formal features of a given course of conduct, for instance the duration or scope of an exclusivity clause, are no longer relevant. Rather, in each and every case, agencies focus on market facts, and conduct is judged in that light. The merit of the more economic approach is to limit "error costs", in particular type I errors -false convictions -and type II errors -false acquittals.
But the more economic approach comes with a steep price, in the form of inflated 54 the General Court of the EU drew inspiration from game theory to craft a three pronged test for tacit collusion in merger cases.
In sum, rather than barking at the more economic approach, and throw the baby with the bathwater, critics should better contribute to the debate on the modernization of old fashioned legal standards.
Opening Competition Law to New Interdisciplinary Insights
Like competition law, antitrust economics are in constant motion, shaped by the evolutions in other areas such as sociology, psychology, neuroscience, marketing, etc. A key challenge for 21 st century agencies will be to integrate those new insights in decision-making 55 .
In particular, the once dominant neoclassical economic view that firms act rationally on the market has lost traction. Court's pronouncements on this issue will be interesting, given their potential to apply in other areas of competition law, where efficiency defenses can similarly be invoked.
But the Court's pronouncement will surely not exhaust the subject. If high tech, fast moving markets become a priority target for enforcement (as they currently seem to be), then the debate will likely arise as to how to balance innovation-related efficiencies, i.e. long term incentives to place new products on markets, with short term anticompetitive price effects. On this, the law provides virtually no guidance. Rather, its insistence on verifiable efficiencies tends to favour short term incremental innovation over major, long term drastic innovation. 76 All the more so, given that companies that develop drastic innovation will surely be reluctant to disclose comprehensive information on their innovation process to antitrust agencies, for fear of leaks to competitors.
Conclusion
This short paper does not pursue grand academic ambitions, but simply intends to call for further research on a string of vexing issues of antitrust law and economics. Whilst some have recently talked of the "simplicity of antitrust", 77 our view is that there are still many fascinating unsettled topics which are open to discussion, with good arguments running in all directions. Key in those issues are, in particular, those related to the overuse of settlements and the symmetrical underuse of other guidance instruments.
ANNEX: Review of the most Popular Topics in Recent Antitrust Literature
To identify the above list of challenges, we have reviewed the papers published in the main antitrust journals since January 2011. 78 The underlying assumption is that those topics that garner the most scholarly attention are those that will constitute the main challenges for the 21 st century.
From this review, we reach several conclusions. First, in its writings, the legal community does not confine itself to the analysis of legal issues but also focuses on policy issues. Almost a quarter (23%) of the articles that were issued from January 2011 address enforcement policy issues or strategies adopted by competition authorities to optimize their grasp on anticompetitive conducts (e.g. efforts to allocate resources efficiently, to improve the territorial coverage of antitrust or to inflict more deterrent sanctions If we sort our dataset per sector, we observe that so-called "innovative" markets get the main attention of the literature. In this respect, the high-tech sector is far ahead any other sectors, despite a significant interest in the doctrine for the pharmaceutical sector.
Finally turning to substantive law issues, we observe that the concept of the "relevant market"
seems the most widely discussed in today's scholarship.
